Monthly Archives: March 2010

I wrote about how to think of resolution authority as a series of practices rather than an on-off switch. A few points are being made around the blogosphere about resolution authority, and I’d like to address them. Information Ezra Klein … Continue reading →

I’ll probably alternate between snarky and serious financial reform blogging to keep myself sane. And right now I’m trying to think of a good metaphor to watch next week’s lobbying and amendment efforts during the markup of Dodd financial reform … Continue reading →

A lot of people are grading resolution authority on a Pass/Fail binary spectrum. It is there, or it is not there? I want to help develop a language to understand, explain and critique resolution authority, not as a present/not present … Continue reading →

Ok, so a crowd-sourcing request. There’s a lot of coverage on the new Chris Dodd financial reform bill, and most of it is trying to find good things to say about the bill. Trying very hard in fact, with varying … Continue reading →

I’m still going through the Dodd Bill. So: The Lehman Report. 1. First of all why don’t we take the rest of the money for the FCIC (“Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission”) and just give it to Jenner & Block to … Continue reading →

Oh no. I can see by just talking about the dynamics of financial reform I’m depressing Kevin Drum. Cheer up: It took 30 years to deregulate the financial industry, it’s not going to be an overnight job to build it … Continue reading →

I was a guest on NPR’s Planet Money on Friday’s episode, Attack of the Special Interests, where I help explain some of the issues related to the CFPA, resolution authority, and derivatives reform coming out Monday, and how the special … Continue reading →

Sometime soon we will get a bill from the Senate on financial reform. Your natural reaction will be to compare it to Barney Frank’s bill that was passed mid-December. What parts of this financial reform bill are stronger compared to … Continue reading →

R.A. (Ryan Avent!) writes in response to my previous entry: [Mike's thesis] places the government in a bind. If it forces banks to write down worthless second mortgages to clear the way for new modifications, then the banks suddenly look … Continue reading →

Three things happened in a row yesterday: (1) Two positive profiles of Timothy Geithner (New Yorker, and The Atlantic) came out, both working under the assumption that the stress tests of last year worked. (2) Shahien Nasiripour had a comment … Continue reading →